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Abstract
This paper develops a methodology to uncover consumer preferences from a discrete-choice
demand model of product differentiation using plant-level data. When prices and quantities
are observed, the appropriate strategy for estimating such model is well developed. However,
most plant-level data sets only report revenue (sales) and total cost, hampering initial
attempts to estimate the model according to standard approaches. This paper offers a way to
circumvent this problem by bringing the extra information provided by usually observable
aggregate data to determine the relevant parameters. The methodology consists of solving for
the demand parameter that matches the total quantity implied by the model of demand and
supply to its observable counterpart. Once this parameter is determined it is possible to define
welfare measures and perform counterfactual simulations. This methodology is applied to
measure the economic impact of a regulatory agency imposing a monopoly break up.
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Many differentiated product industry studies rely on detailed information on 
markets shares and prices to determine consumer preferences and perform policy 
analysis (see Berry,1994, and the literature surveyed therein). However, such detailed 
data sets may be difficult to obtain in many instances. For example, due to 
confidentiality issues or strategic purposes, some firms are unwilling to release the 
relevant data. On the other hand, official statistical agencies usually find more 
welcoming firms when gathering information for plant-level surveys of the 
manufacturing sector. One of the reasons may rely on the fact that, in most cases, 
firms are asked to report only sales revenue and input expenditures, rather than (more 
revealing) information on prices and quantities. Such surveys are commonly available 
for many countries and cover most industries in the manufacturing sector, providing 
an easily accessible source for empirical studies. Surprisingly, only a few studies (to 
my knowledge) have used this source to study differentiate product industries (Klette 
and Griliches,1996, Melitz,2004 and DeSouza,2004). They all rely on Klette and 
Griliches framework which assumes a CES demand system, product differentiation 
and monopolistic competition. However, this model may not be reasonable for many 
industries. Monopolistic competition assumes that firms are not big enough to 
influence the aggregate market variables and therefore a price change by one firm has 
an irrelevant effect on the demand of any other firm. This assumption says that each 
product has no neighbor in the product space, which strongly restricts interaction 
between products (Tirole, 1988). 
  Building on Katayama, Lu and Tybout (2003), KLT henceforth, this paper 
develops an alternative methodology to study (using plant-level data) differentiated 
product markets in which consumer preferences are given by a discrete-choice 
demand function and firms play according to the Bertrand model. This setup relaxes 
some of the restrictions imposed by the Klette and Griliches framework, but poses 
some extra challenges.  
When prices and quantities are observed, the standard strategy goes as follows. 
First, one sets up a parametric theoretical model of consumer and producer choice in 
a differentiated product market. Then, one matches the model’s predictions about 
market shares to their empirical counterparts to obtain the relevant parameters. Once 
these parameters are pinned down it is possible to perform simulation by changing the 
market environment and recalculating the equilibrium prices and quantities. This 
strategy has been pursued in a number of works. A well known example can be found 
in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1999), where they measure the economic impact of a 
voluntary export restraint placed on exports of automobiles from Japan to the United 
States. 
However, most plant-level data sets do not come in a directly usable form. 
Usually, they report only revenue (sales) and total cost instead of price and quantities, 
hampering initial attempts to estimate the model according to the standard approach. 
To overcome this restriction, KLT, using assumptions on a discrete-choice demand 
system, technology and firms’ behavior, show that, given the demand parameters, 
there is a mapping from revenue and cost data to marginal costs, quality, prices and 
quantities. But, due to the lack of observables (e.g. prices, quantities and product 
characteristics), it is not possible to estimate the demand parameters using standard 
inference methods like GMM or ML.     
One way to solve this problem is to introduce more information into the model. 
KLT do this by imposing prior distributions on the unknown parameters and 
performing Bayesian inference. However, as the economic model and the data set 
available are insufficient to perform standard inference, identification relies heavily 
on the priors. Thus, the parameters estimates are prone to be very sensitive to the 
priors.  
This paper uses the same ideas behind the KLT framework, i.e. it assumes a 
discrete-choice demand and price-setting firms to establish a mapping between 
observed revenue and cost data and firms’ decisions.  But this paper markedly differs 
from KLT’s contribution with respect to the identification strategy. Rather than 
imposing prior distributions, this paper proposes bringing usually observable data on 
aggregate physical quantities to pin down the model parameters through a calibration 
technique. 
Although it may be difficult to obtain detailed data on quantities at the plant level, 
the same is not true for aggregate variables. For instance, in the beverage sector, 
information on aggregate consumption of beer is widely available for many countries.  
Shortly, the methodology consists of matching the total quantity implied by the 
mapping to its observable counterpart. The intuition is that aggregate quantity also 
carries information on consumer preferences. Therefore, observing this aggregate 
measure help uncover the demand parameters.  
After pinning down the preference parameters, qualities and marginal costs it is 
possible to construct consumer and producer welfare measures and perform 
counterfactual experiments. This paper last objective is to illustrate the methodology 
using plant-level data from the Colombian beer industry.  
This paper is organized as follows. The following section introduces the   demand 
and supply models. The ensuing section presents an empirical strategy to uncover the 
unobservables that takes into account the limitations imposed by commonly available 
plant-level data. The fourth section shows how to evaluate the welfare effects of 
different market environments (policy simulation) once the parameters of interest are 
determined. The fifth section shows an application of the methodology to the 




In this section I lay out the model that governs consumers and producers 
decisions. The demand system has the familiar logit form while the supply (and 
equilibrium) equation is given by a price-setting game.  
 
Demand Assume that consumers rank products according to their characteristics and 
prices. There are N+1 choices in the market, N inside goods and one outside good. 
Consumer i chooses one of these goods, given prices pj, quality ξj and idiosyncratic 
preferences εij. Consumer i derives utility from consuming firm j’s product according 
to ij j ij u ε δ + =  (j=0,1,..,N), where  j j j p ξ α δ + − = . 
  2
    
McFadden (1981) shows that one can integrate out  ij ε , which is assumed to be an 
identically and independently distributed extreme value random variable, to obtain a 













j s ; j=1,2,…,N                                                                         (1)           
Here, the subscript zero identifies the outside good. Further, taking the log-
difference between sj and s0 the demand equation takes the simple linear relation 
0 0 0 ) ( ln ln ξ ξ α − + − = − j j j p p s s  ;   j=1,2,…,N                                                (2)  
Supply When setting prices, firms take into account demand and cost determinants. 
Therefore, the pricing decision also contains valuable information on consumer 
preferences and market equilibrium. First, assume that each firm f produces a subset 
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where mcj is the marginal cost of producing brand j. If firms behave according to 
Bertrand, then, it can be shown that the price pj of any product j produced by firm f 
must satisfy the following F.O.C   
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The outside good pricing decision is assumed to be exogenous and therefore does 
not interact strategically with the pricing decision of the inside goods. Note that (4) is 
flexible enough to accommodate different market structures. The first structure is the 
single firm product, in which the firm can only control the price of its unique brand. 
The second is the multi-product firm, in which the firm internalizes the price decision 
of all of its brands. A third example is a monopoly, where one firm produces all the 
varieties offered in the market.  
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
 
Obviously, in the absence of disaggregated data on prices and quantities the 
demand and supply equations, (2) and (4) respectively, cannot be directly used for 
estimation. However, from (2) and (4) it is possible to establish a mapping from 
observed revenue and cost data to variables that describe firms’ behavior (e.g 
quantities). Then, this paper shows how to calibrate the demand parameter by asking 
the model to match the observed aggregate quantity. 
  3
    
Mapping More formally, this mapping is derived (and computed) as follows.  
Equation (4) in the text can be rewritten as 











mc p                                                                                     (5)           
Note that firm j’s revenue (Rj) and variable cost (TCj) can be written as Rj=pj.qj, 
TCj=mcj.qj, where qj represents firm j’s production. Thus, one can write the market 
share for firm j as sj=qj/(Q+Q0), where  Q and Q0 represent respectively total 
production of inside goods and total output production of the outside good (both 
represent physical quantities). Hence, substituting these equations into the pricing rule 
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Aggregating over the qj’s results in   
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where NF is the total number of firms. This non-linear equation can be solved 
numerically for Q given (α, R , TC,Q0), where R ={Rj ; j=1,...NF} and 
TC ={TCj ; j=1,...NF}. Then, given the same parameters and data, qj is determined 
from (6), whereas pj , mcj and sj follow trivially from  j j j q R p = ,  j j j q TC mc = and 
sj=qj/(Q+Q0) respectively. Finally, the log-linearized version of the demand system 
(2) can be solved for relative quality aj  
 
0 0 0 ln ln ) .( s s p p a j j j j − + − = − ≡ α ξ ξ   
 
In sum, for a given set (α, R , TC,Q0, p0), this mapping shows how to obtain total 
quantity (Q) and plant-level  information on price, marginal cost, relative quality and 
quantity.  
If good instruments were available, it would be possible to combine them to    
and impose moment restrictions to identify the demand parameter using the familiar 
GMM (see Berry, 1994). The data set one has in mind however does not report 
product characteristics (the usual instruments). The model is therefore not identified.  
One way to solve this problem is to introduce more information into the model. KLT 
use a similar mapping to the one developed above
j a
1 and introduces the required 
additional information into the model by imposing prior distributions on the unknown 
parameters and performing Bayesian inference. However, as the economic model and 
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1 On the one hand, the mapping developed in this paper generalizes the one found in KLT in order to 
accommodate multi-plant ownership as required by this paper’s application. In the Colombian beer 
industry one firm owns more than one plant. On the other hand it restricts the discrete-choice model to 
have the simple logit form and not its more general version (the nested the logit) as assumed in the 
KLT mapping. This restriction is necessary to implement the calibration methodology. This will be 




the data set available are insufficient to perform standard inference, identification 
relies heavily on the priors. Thus, the parameters estimates are prone to be very 
sensitive to the priors. This paper offers an alternative route by bringing commonly 
available numbers on aggregate quantity to uncover the demand parameter and other 
empirically relevant unobservables.      
 
 Equilibrium aggregate quantity also carries information on consumer 
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                              (8)          
The vector  Q Q TC R  is observed. Therefore, α  can be determined  






ns underlying the simple logit are 
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4. Policy Simulation 
 
n advantage of structural estimation is that, once the parameters of interest are 
det
                                                
preferences. Therefore, observing this aggregate measure may help uncover the 
demand parameters. Indeed, from the discussion above, the model implies that th
total production of the inside goods (Q) is given by a function of (α, R, TC, Q0). 
Assuming that one can observe the total production of the inside goods (Q
obs), one
can ask the model to match this observed quantity according to 
obs Q Q TC R Q = ) , , , (α                                                              0
) , , , ( 0
obs 2
 (8). Then,  obtained by reapplying the mapping. Note 
however that (8) is based on a simple logit model instead of more sophisticat
setups like nested logit model and the full-random coefficient model (Berry, 
Levinhson and Pakes, 1995; Nevo, 2000). The assumptions underlying the sim
logit model place restrictive assumptions on consumer preferences such that 
cross-price effects have notoriously undesirable properties
3. The model could
appended to accommodate more sophisticated setups, and consequently, more 
plausible cross-price effects. However, observing more variables would be 
necessary to devise other calibrating equations and uncover the extra param
introduced by these new setups. Thus, due to the limitation commonly found in 
plant-level data sets the logit model restrictive assumptions cannot be relaxed in 
this calibration framework. For instance, notice that a nest-logit model would 
introduce another parameter on the left side of (8). Then, one would have to so
for two parameters with only one equation (8). 
It is worth noticing that the assumptio
ertheless less restrictive than those imposed by previous plant-level studies of 
differentiated product markets where firms are assumed to behave according to the 
monopolistic competition setup. In this market set cross-price effects are even more 
restricted, since the price change by one firm has an irrelevant effect on the demand 
of any other firm. 
A
ermined, one can simulate the effect of different market environments using the 
usual welfare metrics. The framework for counterfactual simulations laid out in this 
section is standard in discrete-choice demand models. The distinctive difference is 
that the entries on the welfare metrics are obtained by the calibration equation and the 
 
2 This model could potentially be estimated through some non-linear econometric method as NLLS. 
However, the series for aggregate quantity is usually small, hampering quality inference. 
3 The cross-price derivative between varieties r and j ( ) j r p s ∂ ∂  depend only on the product of their 
market shares, and not, as one should intuitively expect, on their own characteristics and the 
characteristics (and market shares) of the other varieties.    
transformation algorithm. Indeed, α  is pinned down by (8) and then prices, marginal 
costs and qualities are obtained from the transformation algorithm.  
The counterfactual experiment goes as follows. Determine the demand parameters 
and uncover prices, quantities, marginal costs and qualities according to the 
calibration methodology described above. Next, impose an exogenous market 
environment change (e.g. one can reduce the price of the outside good, split up a 
monopoly into smaller firms or merge the largest firms) and recalculate the new 
equilibrium prices  and quantities  from (4) holding relative quality and 
marginal cost fixed. The remaining task is to calculate the welfare variation for 
consumers and producers. McFadden (1981) shows that, in the logit model, consumer 
surplus variation ( ) is given by  
) (
*








































           (9)         
In turn, producer surplus ( ) is given by a simpler equation. It is just the sum of 
profits of all active firms. Thus, the variation in producer surplus can be calculated 
from the following equation 
PS
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* * ) ( ) (                                                 (10) 
 
The section below shows an application of the methodology developed so far to 
study the impact of a regulatory action against an established monopoly in the 
Colombian beer industry.  I emphasize though that the purpose of this application is 
to show how to manipulate the calibration strategy and a counterfactual experiment, 
rather than providing a detailed study of the beer industry.  
 
5. An Application to the Colombian Beer Industry 
 
After an aggressive horizontal merger strategy in the early seventies, Cerveceria 
Bavaria became a monopoly in the domestic production of beer by acquiring rivals 
like  Cerveceria Aguila, Cerveceria Union, Cerveceria Andina and other smaller 
producers. Imports never accounted for more that 7% of the Colombian domestic beer 
market during the 1970’s. Monopolist firms are expected to set prices higher than 
competitive levels and therefore to enjoy high profits at the expense of consumers’ 
welfare. In this way, an interesting experiment consists in calculating the welfare 




 Variables Definitions and Data Description The data set consists of an unbalanced 
panel of plants in the Colombian beer industry, with more than 10 employees, in 
1977. These data were originally collected by the Colombia’s Departamento 
Nacional de Estadistica (DANE) and have been cleaned as described in Roberts 
(1996). The revenue series are constructed as the total sales revenue and the total 
variable costs are defined as the sum of payments to labor, intermediate input 
purchases and energy purchases. Since plant-level prices and quantities are not 
directly observed the methodology described in the previous sections applies. From    
an additional source (UN database) I obtain the total quantity of beer (in hectoliters) 
produced in the country for the same sample period. Ideally, one would want to have 
data on the quantity of beer consumed in the country. However, the data in hand is 
not so restrictive since there is very little export activity in this sector.  
Then, I define an inside good as a domestically produced beer. I also use auxiliary 
data to uncover the price of the outside good, defined here as imported beer (p0)
4, as 
well as its imported quantity in hectoliters (Q0). In a separate publication DANE also 
reports the net weight (in kilos) and the monetary value of beer imports (in pesos). 
Assuming that beer has the same density as water
5 (1kg per liter), it is easy to 
transform the net weight in kilos to volume of imported beer in hectoliters (Q0). Then, 
p0 follows from the ratio of the peso value of imports to Q0.  
 
 Simulation Experiment and Results Below, I develop a counterfactual experiment 
that simulates the welfare effects of a regulatory action against the Bavaria monopoly. 
First, assume that the government was considering action against the Bavaria 
monopoly in 1977. Calibrating the model for this year yields an “estimate” for the 
demand parameter (α is found to be equal to 2.77). Then, suppose that a regulatory 
agency plans to split up the Bavaria conglomerate into smaller independent 
companies. Next, calculate the new equilibrium prices and market shares given the 
new ownership structure from (4). Finally, compute welfare variation for consumers 
and producers from equations (9) and (10). 
The second column of Table 1 presents the new plant owners after the break-up. For 
instance, firm A owns plants 1 to 8, Firm B plants 9 to 14, and so on
6. As the market 
becomes more competitive with more rival brands, prices are expected to drop. 
Indeed, prices experience a sharp decrease, the average price falls by 47,43%. Market 
shares do not change considerably; they all increase by a small percentage, mostly at 
the expense of the imported variety, which goes from a 6% market participation to 
virtually zero (0.01%). This is simply the standard finding that more competitive 
environments generate higher output
7. It should be noted, however, that this result is 
driven by the assumption that the price of the outside good is exogenously determined 
in the model. If this were not the case, one would probably see a decrease in the 
imported good price, dampening the decline in its market share. Driven by lower 
prices, consumer welfare goes up by 8,79 millions (in 1977 pesos), while total profits 
go down by 8,24 millions. The consumer surplus effect dominates the producer 
surplus effect such that the increase in social welfare is 0.55 millions
8. 
A legitimate question is to ask whether the calibration methodology gives a 
reasonable value forα . The answer is affirmative. The welfare analysis, calculated 
after calibratingα ( 77 . 2 = α ), shows that the social gains (0.55 millions) from 
                                                 
4 This is a composite good that bundles together all the different imported varieties. 
5 More than 96% of beer content is water. 
6 I have also simulated different ownership arrangements. For example, instead of five firms with 
similar shares (the case analyzed in this paper), I tried the scenario where the split up would result in 
only 3 firms. Results were similar. 
7 Domestic output since total output is fixed.  
  7
 
8 These figures could change if one factors in non-price competition effects, e.g, advertising and brand 
introduction. For instance, the market structure may influence the decision to introduce new brands and 
therefore change welfare calculation. In order to determine if these effects exist one needs a dynamic 
model of brand introduction. However, an empirical model of dynamic decisions, such as advertising 
and brand introduction, has yet to be developed. Pakes and Macguire (1994) framework gives a lead on 
how to model such dynamic decisions.    
  8
 
breaking up the monopoly are not very high, implying that monopoly power is 
limited. This finding is consistent with previous studies of the beer industry. One 





This paper develops a methodology to study differentiated product industries 
using plant-level data sets that report only revenue and input expenditures, not prices 
or quantities. By bringing the extra information on aggregate quantity, a calibration 
technique is derived to uncover the empirically relevant unobservables. Once these 
unobservables are uncovered it is possible to perform counterfactual experiments. I 
demonstrate the methodology by conducting a simulation of a monopoly break-up 
that gives monetary figures to consumer gains and producers losses.  
Due to limitations commonly found in plant-level data sets the restrictive 
assumptions underlying the logit model can not be relaxed in the framework 
developed here. These assumptions are nevertheless less restrictive than the ones 
imposed in previous plant-level studies of differentiated product industries, where 
firms are assumed to behave according to the monopolistic competition setup. In this 
way, this paper can be seen as a step forward in the effort to devise (reasonable) 
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gain in % 
 
Price variation 
in %   
 
1 A  BAV  1.99 0.08  -55.16 
2 A  BAV  2.06 0.08  -56.14 
3 A  BAV  4.65 0.19  -58.65 
4 A  BAV  0.48 0.02  -19.06 
5 A  BAV  2.51 0.10  -55.69 
6 A  BAV  3.85 0.15  -46.40 
7 A  BAV  1.97 0.08  -53.85 
8 A  BAV  3.78 0.15  -57.09 
9 B  BAV  2.22 0.38  -57.61 
10 B  BAV  2.06 0.35  -56.99 
11 B  BAV  4.50 0.77  -30.85 
12 B  BAV  1.68 0.29  -22.81 
13 B  BAV  1.12 0.19  -54.05 
14 B  BAV  0.60 0.10  -66.35 
15 C  BAV  22.11 0.64  -79.20 
16 D  BAV  1.38 0.10  -54.00 
17 D  BAV  3.21 0.24  -68.12 
18 D  BAV  9.15 0.67  -59.73 
19 E  BAV  19.46 1.25  -55.31 
20 D  BAV  5.04 0.37  -66.26 
         
   Other important Measures     
      
Consumer surplus variation  8798004    
Producer surplus variation  -8243465    
Social Surplus variation  554538.8    
Average Price variation  47.43%    
      
Column 2 presents the fictitious denominations (A, B, C, D and E) for the firms that are created 
after the split up. Before the counterfactual scenario all plants (identified in column1) belong to 
Bavaria (BAV). The fifth column, in turn, presents the slice of the market they add to their previous 
shares. The welfare measures are given in 1977 Colombian pesos. 
 